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ARTICLE
Law and the Emotions
ERIC A. POSNER*
INTRODUCTION

The role of the emotions is much neglected in legal theory. This should be
puzzling, because emotions play an important role in many areas of the law.
Consider the following examples:
" A person who kills while angry is usually guilty of a less serious crime
than a person who kills in a calm, unemotional state, but not if the anger
is caused by hatred rather than shame.
" Judges exclude photographs of gruesome crime scenes, even when the
photographs have probative value, if the photographs are likely to
provoke extreme outrage or disgust. The use of victim impact statements
in capital sentencing has been criticized for inflaming the jury against
the defendant and defended as a way of enhancing the jury's empathy
for the victim.
" A common justification for workplace, environmental, and consumer
product regulation is that individuals lack information about the risks
that they face. Unexplored is the role that fear plays in decisions to fly
on airplanes or use air bags, and how agencies should regulate in
response to panics about health risks.
" Mediators have long known that anger and other emotions interfere with
bargaining, but these emotions are overlooked in contract theory. Emotional response to breach of contract has important implications for the
design of remedies in contract law.
" Market behavior and responses to cost-benefit surveys often reflect emotional
reactions that people disclaim when they are calm. Should this information
likewise be discounted by agencies engaging in cost-benefit analysis, or
should it be treated as valid data on actual preferences?
These examples raise questions about the relationship between emotion and
law, but legal theory is unprepared to answer them. One reason for the neglect
of emotions in legal theory may be that the dominant strains of normative legal
theory-economic analysis, moral-philosophical analysis, and constitutional
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analysis-rely on methodologies that are not well suited to analyzing emotion.
Another reason may be the primitive state of the psychology literature on the
topic. Psychologists admit that they do not have a good theory of the emotions,
in part because research in this area is relatively new. Yet a review of that
literature reveals a number of insights that are sufficiently well developed to be
of value for legal theory. And, indeed, in the past few years the emotions have
begun to interest a small but growing group of legal theorists.
This Article contributes to this small literature by providing a framework for
analyzing the relationship between law and the emotions. The theory draws on
the economic model of consumer choice, but it does not reduce emotional
behavior to rational self-interest. Instead, it relaxes the consumer choice model
in order to account for emotional behavior.2 The framework assumes that
people's "calm" preferences-that is, the preferences that they have when they
are not emotionally aroused-differ from their "emotion state" preferences,
which are skewed toward the stimulus that provokes the emotion. Further,
people's abilities and beliefs about the world often differ in calm states and
emotion states. Because people can anticipate their emotional responses to various
conditions, they will often take steps either to avoid or to pursue these conditions, and to cultivate certain beneficial emotional dispositions. By changing
payoffs from behavior taken in emotion states, the law can influence both incentives
in the emotion state and incentives to cultivate desirable emotional dispositions.
Although the framework does simplify, it is not simplistic, and it sheds light
on the debates discussed above. Its predictions are straightforward; the main
contribution is clarifying the relationship between emotions and rational action
by placing them in the rational choice framework that is now the standard
approach to analyzing private law and some aspects of public law. 3 After
discussing the psychology literature (Part I) and laying out the framework (Part
II), I analyze emotions as excuses in criminal and tort law (Part III), the
manipulation of the emotions of juries (Part IV), regulation of emotion-laden

1. See, e.g., THE PASSIONS OF LAW (Susan Bandes ed., 1999); Symposium on Law, Psychology, and
the Emotions, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1423, 1426-29 (2000). Some of these essays and other legal work
on the emotions are cited infra.
2. This approach differs from existing treatments of emotions in several ways. First, all economists
tend to treat emotions as purely irrational states rather than states in which preferences and other
attributes temporarily change. Second, Frank and Hirshleifer focus on the evolutionary significance of
emotion, namely, how it may enable people to keep commitments or make credible threats. Becker's
work is complex and in some ways my account overlaps with it, see infra notes 17, 28, but his main
focus has been on how envy and altruism affect family behavior, and how people might try to inculcate
others with certain emotional dispositions. His discussions of guilt are casual, and he has little to say on
emotion as a general category. Third, none of the authors discuss the legal issues that I analyze. See
generally GARY S. BECKER, ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES (1996); ROBERT FRANK, PASSIONS WrrHIN REASON
(1988); Jack Hirshleifer, The Emotions as Guarantorsof Threats and Promises, in THE LATEST ON TE
BEST 307 (John Dupr6 ed., 1987); Richard A. Posner, Retribution and Related Concepts of Punishment,
9 J. LEGAL STO. 71 (1980).
3. For methodological concerns with this approach, see Toni M. Massaro, Show (Some) Emotions, in
THE PASSIONS OF LAW, supra note 1, at 92-93.
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risks (Part V), bargaining in contract law when parties are emotional (Part VI),
and emotions in normative legal theory (Part VII).
I should comment at the outset about the relationship between the current
inquiry and the field of law and cognitive psychology or "behavioral law and
economics." This field has, so far, focused on cognition rather than emotion. It
focuses on errors in judgment, such as the underestimation of small probabilities, the reliance on anchoring devices when making evaluations, and the
tendency to value items in hand more than items possessed by others. There is,
of course, some overlap with emotion. Some cognitive errors are said to be the
result of dread, and some psychologists have recently argued that cognitive
biases are best analyzed as the result of emotional dispositions or feelings.4 But
to avoid redundancy with the many legal articles that use cognitive psychology,
I confine myself to understandings of the emotions that do not substantially
overlap with the cognitive psychology literature.5
I.

THE EMOTIONS

Although psychology lacks a widely accepted theory of emotion and many
fundamental issues about the nature of emotion remain unresolved, 6 much
progress has been made in the last thirty years, and agreement on some
important issues has been achieved. An emotion is a psychological phenomenon
with the following distinctive characteristics: 7 Emotions are usually stimulated
by the world, either via the mediation of cognition or through a more primitive
stimulus-response-like neurological mechanism. They have a certain feel or
affect characterized, usually, by a focus on a particular stimulus with the result
that the rest of'the environment "fades" (a little or a lot, depending on the
strength of the emotion) though does not disappear altogether. An angry person
feels a kind of warmth and agitation, which is directed usually at another
person, the result of a slight or offense. A person who is disgusted feels a kind
of nausea, which is directed at the object that provokes the disgust. The rest of
the world remains, but at a remove: An angry person might restrain himself
because he does not want to be arrested for assault; a disgusted person might
overcome the urge to withdraw because he wants to help a person with a

4. George E Loewenstein et al., Risk as Feelings (1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
5. For some interesting arguments about the relationship between economics, law, emotions, and
psychology, see generally Anne C. Dailey, The Hidden Economy of the Unconscious, 74 CHI.-KENr L.
REV. 1599 (2000) (discussing law and emotions from a psychoanalytic perspective); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Limits of Social Norms, 74 CHI.-KEr L. REV. 1537 (2000) (criticizing psychologically
impoverished approaches to law and social norms).
6. See JON ELSTER, ALcHEMIEs OF THE MIND: RATIONALITY AND THE EMOTIONS 243 (1999); PAUL EKMAN
& RICHARD J. DAVIDSON, THE NATURE OF EMOTION: FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS 97-177 (1994) (describing

twelve unresolved questions about the nature of emotions).
7. See ELSTER, supra note 6, at 246-83; NIco H. FRIJDA, THE EMOTIONS 473-79 (1986); CARROLL E.
IZARD, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EMOTIONS 27-57 (1991); RICHARD S. LAZARUS, EMOTION AND ADAPTATION 3-86

(1991).
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disgusting wound or he knows that the disgusting substance is medicine.
Although emotions are usually accompanied by physiological changes, there
does not appear to be a one-to-one correspondence between the different
emotions and physiological states; 8 emotion has an irreducibly mental component.
One useful approach to understanding the emotions is to think about them
against the background of the theory of consumer choice. In doing so, I follow
cognitive psychology, which got its start by criticizing expected utility theory. I
also follow the literature on the psychology of the emotions, which appears to
understand emotion against an implicit theory of rational behavior. 9
Emotions are troublesome for rational choice theory's assumption that people
choose actions in a way that is consistent with their preferences. It is common to
think of emotions as "outside" forces that compel one to act inconsistently with
the interests of the self. This conception is familiar from everyday excuses for
offensive conduct. A person might apologize for insulting someone else by
explaining that he was angry, depressed, or irritable. The implication is always
that the speaker is not fully responsible for his actions because he was taken
over by his emotions. The problem with this view is that emotion is never a
fully sufficient excuse; the reason for the emotional reaction always matters.10 If
anger was justified by some earlier wrong committed against the agent, then
anger may be an excuse. If it resulted from an innocent mistake, then the anger
is no excuse. Whether a person's emotional state excuses his conduct depends
upon both whether the person could have avoided the emotion or avoided the
stimulus that provoked the emotion and whether the emotion reflects acceptable
moral beliefs about others and the world.
A better way to think about emotions is to start by noting that a person's
preferences might have different emotional valences. X has a preference that Y
not be present. The preference could be more or less intense, but let us fix the
intensity by supposing that X is willing to pay $100 to avoid encountering Y.
Economic analysis usually stops at this point, and takes this number as given.
But it may also be relevant that X's preferences have an emotional coloring. X's
emotions toward Y are qualitatively distinct, and this difference cannot be
reduced to a dollar amount. X might hate Y, be angry at Y, or be disgusted with
Y-while in all cases having the same monetized preference to avoid Y.
Do these distinctions matter? In some cases, reducing emotionally colored
desires for certain world states to a monetized preference ordering is unobjectionable. If we are simply concerned with deterring certain behavior, and if the
emotionality of the desire does not result in an idiosyncratic influence on
8. This is William James's hypothesis. See WILLIAM JAMES, THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY (1890).
9. However, the very idea of the separation of rationality and emotion is criticized in this literature.
For a vivid example, see ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES' ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE HuMAN
BRAIN 191-96 (1994).
10. See Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in CriminalLaw, 96
COLUM. L. REv. 269, 285-89 (1996) (emphasizing the cognitive content of emotion).

HeinOnline -- 89 Geo. L.J. 1980 2000-2001

20011

LAW AND THE EMOTIONS

1981

decisionmaking, knowledge of an affected person's costs and gains is sufficient
for determining policy. Angry and calm drivers are sufficiently deterred if they
must pay the social cost of their behavior. But in some contexts the emotional
coloring of a preference does have instrumental and normative consequences.
From an instrumental perspective, the effectiveness of different kinds of
sanctions often depends on a person's emotion state. An angry person discounts
future sanctions, but may be quite sensitive to claims about the provocation. If
you.push into a person, you are more likely to avoid being punched in the nose
if you tell him that you tripped than if you remind him that he could go to jail
for assault. Anger is also vulnerable to delaying tactics and cooling off periods.
By contrast, hatred is a more constant emotion and is less likely to be extinguished by a reasonable explanation. Further, we expect irascible people to
avoid places where their anger is likely to be provoked, just as we expect
epileptics to avoid driving or to take drugs that prevent seizures. Fear, disgust,
and the other emotions all have their idiosyncrasies, and a well-designed legal
system exploits them differently.
From a normative perspective, the bare fact that a person has acted under the
influence of emotion does not excuse his conduct. In fact, while some emotions
mitigate guilt, others enhance guilt. Anger provoked by betrayal mitigates guilt,
but anger provoked by unacceptable moral beliefs may increase guilt. Hate
rarely excuses murder, but real fear, even if not fully justified, might mitigate
culpability.
Both of these observations assume that people remain rational while under
the influence of emotion; emotion is rarely a mere reflex to some external
stimulus." An angry, disgusted, fearful, or sad person usually can deliberate
about his behavior and does not (with the possible exception of certain kinds of
fear) engage in reflexive action. This suggests that people continue to act
rationally while in an emotion state, even though they act differently from the
way they do in the calm state. One can capture this point by positing that during
the emotion state people experience temporary variations in their preferences,
abilities, and beliefs.
Their preferences change so that what psychologists call the "action tendency" of an emotion becomes relatively attractive. The action tendency of
anger is to strike out. We can say that a person, while angry, develops a
temporary preference to strike the person who offends him. The action tendency
of disgust is to withdraw. A person, while disgusted, develops a temporary
preference to withdraw from the disgusting object. Grief produces withdrawal
from other people and preoccupation with the lost person or thing; fear produces flight from a threat; pity produces aid. But before-and usually after-the
emotion state, the person's preferences are constant (the "calm preferences"), so
he might disapprove of what he expects to do, or did, in the emotion state. It is
11. This principle is widely recognized. See, e.g., Patricia Greenspan, Emotional Strategies and
Rationality, 110 ETics 469, 471-75 (2000).
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this inconsistency over time that makes emotional behavior seem irrational, but
it is important to see that a person in an emotion state does not act irrationally
given his temporary preferences.
Abilities may also change in the grip of an emotion. When the emotion state
occurs, the agent may find himself more alert and vigorous, perhaps stronger, or
simply less reliant on slow-moving deliberation. The angry person is aroused;
he feels less pain, tires less quickly, responds more rapidly to movement. The
anxious or fearful person becomes more alert to the environment and flees
quickly from danger. A grief-stricken person may experience a decline in
abilities; everything becomes more difficult to do. Evidence of physiological
changes-hormonal changes, increase in the heart rate, and so forth-supports
12
the view that-abilities change during some emotion states.
Finally, beliefs may change during emotion states. An angry person overestimates the probability that the offender will attack him, or that the provocation
was not an accident but the result of intent to harm or humiliate. A fearful
person overestimates the probability of harm associated with the threat that
causes his fear.' 3 Joyful people underestimate risks of harm, while pessimistic
people overestimate the same risks.
Thus, my claim is that during the emotion state, a person acts rationally, that
is, internally consistently, given the new and usually temporary preferences,
abilities, and beliefs that the person has in that emotion state. The actions taken
during the emotion state will, of course, affect the agent's endowments, and this
may have consequences for the person's behavior after the emotion state is over.
Aside from that, I assume that preferences, abilities, and emotions during the
14
calm state are the same before and after the emotion state.
My final point is that agents anticipate their emotion states and take actions in
anticipation of them. "Emotional disposition" refers to a person's tendency to
feel an emotion. An irascible person is more likely to become angry; a fearful
person is more likely to become scared. People usually know their emotional
dispositions and can take steps to modify them or to avoid conditions that
activate them. Suppose, for example, that a person knows that if he goes to a
rowdy bar, he may be insulted, and further he knows that he is irascible. Upon
being insulted, he might strike the person who insulted him. To avoid this, he
can (1) knowing about his emotional disposition avoid the bar, or (2) earlier on
try to overcome his irascibility through meditation or other behavior modification techniques.

12. See RICHARD E. NISBETr & Dov
SOUTH 47 (1996).

COHEN, CULTURE OF HONOR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF VIOLENCE IN THE

13. See Ame Ohman, Fearand Anxiety as Emotional Phenomena: Clinical Phenomenology, Evolutionary Perspectives, and Information-ProcessingMechanisms, in HANDBOOK OF EMOTIONS 520 (Mi-

chael Lewis & Jeannette M. Haviland eds., 1993) (noting that the fear "system is biased sometimes to
evoke defense in actually nonthreatening contexts").
14. To keep the analysis simple, I focus on changes in preferences and generally omit considerations
of changes in beliefs and abilities.
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One can unify these ideas about the emotions using the metaphor of emotional capacities as information-processing mechanisms. 5 To understand this
metaphor, consider the instinctive withdrawal of the hand from a hot surface.
One does not deliberate before withdrawing the hand; one just does it. Yet it is
possible to resist the impulse and sometimes desirable to do so-for example, in
order to withdraw a valuable object from a fire. Evolution explains the instinct
as a cognitive shortcut; on average, the individual does better by withdrawing
quickly than by deliberating, but in certain cases it is better not to withdraw.
There is a kind of psychological compromise. The pain drives the individual to
withdraw, but with special effort he can overcome the pain and engage in the
desirable action. On average, the individual submits to the pain and withdraws;
in special circumstances, he resists the pain.
So with emotions. The best response to a stimulus may be rapid reaction even
before enough information is available to make a correct decision. On average,
fleeing from a tiger, withdrawing from a smelly substance, striking someone
who insults you, and so forth, may be the best thing to do; but in particular
cases it may be better to resist the emotional reaction. By supplying the optimal
average reaction, the emotional capacities economize on information-processing, but sometimes produce outcomes different from those that would be chosen
if there were enough time to deliberate. When a person deliberates in a calm
state, he is less likely to deviate from his optimal behavior, but he will spend
more time before making the choice. The affect accompanying the emotionthe sense of fear, of nausea-must be overcome as a pain must be overcome,
and it will be overcome only when the offsetting considerations are significant.
Emotional capacities in humans evolved in a primitive environment and so
are not always attuned to modem needs. But individuals (and their parents)
"invest" in these assets in order to bring them closer in line with the requirements of modem living. That means being able to avoid being angered by
stimuli when anger will lead to retaliation, jail, or other injuries, or being able to
control one's anger after it is stimulated. It means being able to control pity or
greed when they are stimulated by conditions for which these emotions are
unsuited. The con man exploits these emotions and is particularly successful
with businessmen who are alone in strange cities, without friends or associates
to reason with them.1 6 The doctor, servant, and soldier invest in different kinds
of thick skin: the doctor, against disgust; the servant, against envy; and the
soldier, against fear. Those who make good investments obtain high returns in
their interactions with other people.
The metaphor of emotional capacity as information-processing mechanism
helps one see that emotional capacities are a form of human capital, and thus
appropriate objects for legal concern. Just as the law affects how one invests in
and spends one's human capital, it can affect how one invests in, and uses, one's
15. See FRIJDA, supra note 7, at 453.
16. See DAVID W. MAURER, THE BIG CON: THE STORY OF THE CONFIDENCE MAN 115-18 (1999).

HeinOnline -- 89 Geo. L.J. 1983 2000-2001

THE GEORGETOWN

1984

LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 89:1977

emotional capacities. Consider education, a form of human capital. An educated
person acts differently from an uneducated person on average. For example,
because the opportunity cost of leisure is higher, the educated person may work
more. Similarly, a person who has invested in restraining her sense of disgust is
more likely to become a doctor than a person who has not. When the return on
an investment is modified by law, people's investment decisions are affected.
Just as taxing high incomes may discourage people from obtaining educations,
so may punishing people who commit crimes of passion encourage people to
cultivate a more peaceful disposition. These and other ways that law affects
people's incentives to cultivate, and act on, their emotions, are the subject of the
remainder of this Article.
II. A

FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING LAW AND THE EMOTIONS
A. ASSUMPTIONS

The model of consumer choice assumes that individuals are able to rank the
various states of the world that will result from their choices. A utility function
maps the states of the world to a number, so that we say that an individual's
utility rises as he obtains increasingly preferred states of the world. Individuals
have certain abilities, which enable them to engage in a particular action at
higher or lower cost. They also have budgets that limit the amount of resources
that they can spend in satisfying their preferences.
Economists usually assume that preferences remain stable over the period of
time relevant to analysis. If individuals switch from labor to leisure after an
increase of the tax on their income, the usual explanation is that the opportunity
cost of leisure declines, not that the tax increase happened to coincide with an
exogenously caused change in preference; though of course, the latter is possible as a theoretical matter. The reason for this convention is that economics
has nothing to say about how preferences change;' 7 so any economic, as
opposed to psychological, explanation for behavior must look to other factors.
I depart from this model, though I hew as closely as possible. I assume that
under certain conditions a "stimulus" will produce an emotion state, during
which certain otherwise fixed attributes of the agent change. After some time
passes, the emotion state ends, and the attributes return to what they were before
the emotion state occurred. The attribute on which I will focus is the preference.
During the emotion state, preferences reflect a higher ranking of world states
that are relevant to the emotion, or as I will sometimes say, the emotion-relevant
good will become more intensely preferred. In addition, abilities may change
during the emotion state: The agent may become more or less able to convert
inputs, like time and energy, into outputs like labor or attack. And beliefs may
change during the emotion state: The emotion may cause the agent to believe
that an emotion-relevant probability is higher than the probabilities he attaches
17. But see BECKER, supra note 2, at 18-19.
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to it during the calm state (sometimes, the emotion-relevant probability may be
more accurate).' 8
"Stimulus" refers to the set of environmental or interpersonal conditions that,
whether via cognitive interpretation or not, set off an emotional reaction. An
insult coming from a stranger stimulates anger. The observation of sewage or
rotting meat stimulates disgust. Receipt of an award stimulates pride or happiness. Learning about a rival's success stimulates envy. Observation of a child's
misery stimulates compassion or pity. In each case, some aspect of the environment provokes the emotional reaction. As should be clear from these examples,
emotional reaction to a stimulus is not necessarily a reflex, but often involves an
appraisal of surrounding conditions and all the cognitive work that this term
implies. '9

My final assumption is that people can cultivate their emotions.2 ° People are
self-conscious and generally (though not always) knowledgeable about their
emotional dispositions, and they can recognize when these emotional dispositions lead them astray as well as take steps to modify them. The idea of
cultivating emotions or even emotionless calm is similar to the simpler act of
avoiding stimuli of destructive emotions. A person might seek to control her
anger or envy through meditation, yoga, religious pursuits, and so forth, or she
may also do so by avoidance. She might stop going to bars where people slight
her; she might move away from cities or neighborhoods where conspicuous
consumption is the norm; she might avoid homeless people. In these cases, the
person avoids stimuli of anger, envy, or pity that might get her into trouble or
simply be unpleasant to experience. Cultivation of emotional dispositions and
simple avoidance are, of course, very different behaviors, but they can be
treated as the same for purpose of analysis.
Students of the emotions will notice that the framework is better suited to
some emotions (fear, disgust, anger) than others, such as love and jealousy. The
"higher emotions" are more complex, have great cognitive content, have less
distinctive physiological manifestations, are less uniform across cultures, have
fewer obvious correlates in animals, and are-to get to the p6int-more poorly

18. The notion that preferences, abilities, and beliefs change during th& emotion state is meant to
capture in a very schematic way the "affect program" theory of the primary emotions (surprise, fear,
anger, disgust, sadness, joy). See, e.g., PAUL EKMAN ET AL., EMOTIONS IN THE HUMAN FACE 11-13 (1972).
The most important idea associated with this theory is that the primary emotions have a biological basis
and evolutionary explanation, and that they act as cognitive shortcuts. As a result, people react in
adaptive ways to (often, threatening) stimuli even when this means ignoring certain beliefs. For
example, one may be scared in the dark even though one knows that there is nothing to be afraid of. A
useful discussion can be found in PAUL E. GRIuIms, WHAT EMOTIONS REALLY ARE 77-99 (1997).
19. See, e.g., LAZARUS, supra note 7, at 149-52. Appraisal refers to cognitive processes by which the
agent ascertains the personal significance of the stimulus, how it can be dealt with, what it means for
his goals, and so forth. Id.
20. For a similar idea, see Richard H. Thaler & H.M. Shefrin, An Economic Theory of Self-Control,
in QUASI RATIONAL ECONOMICS 77 (Richard H. Thaler ed., 1991). Thaler and Shefrin analyze self-control
as a purely cognitive phenomenon and do not discuss emotions.
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understood by psychologists. 2 Fortunately, they also seem to play a smaller
role in the law, and I will, for the most part, avoid them.
B. ORDER OF ACTIONS

Our simple model of the emotions assumes a stylized order of events,
represented by the timeline in Figure 1:

I

I
investment

I

stimulus
act
---- emotion state----

I
end

Figure 1: Emotion-State Timeline
The first event is the agent's investment in either cultivating an emotional
disposition or avoiding conditions that will stimulate the emotion. The second
event is the application of the stimulus that provokes an emotion. Next comes
the emotion state. This refers to the actual occurrence of the emotion. It may
last for an instant or for a very long time. For example, the agent may be
angered when someone pushes him from behind, but the anger disappears
almost immediately when he sees that the person who pushed him had tripped
on his shoelaces. Envy may fester for months or years; love and grief also may
last for a long time. For purposes of analysis it is assumed that the emotion ends
at some definite point and the non-emotional or "calm" state returns.
During the emotion state the agent chooses to act, just as he does before the
state. The same set of choices presents itself to the agent as before, except the
change in environment that stimulates the emotion might introduce new choices.
Before the stimulus, the agent has no desire to injure person P; after P insults
him, however, he now has such a desire and may act on it. But he may not. As
noted earlier, the emotion state affects the agent by changing his preferences so
that the emotion-relevant goods are more heavily weighted, and by increasing
or reducing his cost of action. Sanctions and other costs thus continue to
influence the agent's choice; what is different is that the costs and benefits of
action differ, slightly or greatly, from what they were during the calm state.
After the emotion state ends, the agent returns to the calm state, which means
that his preferences and abilities return to what they were in the pre-emotion
state. But his actions during the emotion state will have changed his endowments, so he may be better or worse off than he was before the emotion state
occurred.
The timeline highly simplifies even the simplest emotions. One problem is
that an emotional experience can be relived, not just reimagined, and so an
emotion state will "tail off," and sometimes renew itself later in time. I observe

21. See Gi rrms, supra note 18, at 100-06.
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a disgusting slime, but I withdraw and soon forget about it. Later the appearance
and smell of the syrup I am pouring on my pancakes reminds me of the slime,
and I am again disgusted. Similarly, my anger at an insult renews itself every
time I am reminded of the insult. This complexity needs to be kept in mind.
C. ANALYSIS

The agent's choice during the emotion state can be represented using the
standard graphical rendering of consumer choice, shown in Figure 2. The
vertical axis represents the "amount" of the emotion-relevant good (Y). If the
agent is angry, the axis represents the degree of injury inflicted on the person at
whom the agent is angry. If the agent is disgusted, the axis represents the degree
of withdrawal from the object of disgust. If the agent is in love, it represents
some measure of benefit to the beloved as experienced by the agent. The
horizontal axis represents all the other goods that the agent wants to consume
(X).

y

UE

B
UN

X
Figure 2: Representing Emotional and Moral Preferences
The graph depicts the agent's "normal" or calm-state indifference curve (UN)
and the corresponding emotion-state indifference curve (UE). The emotion-state
indifference curve is flatter than the calm-state indifference curve, representing
the fact that in the emotion state, the agent's preferences for the emotionrelevant good become more intense. The result is that the agent will give up
more of the ordinary goods than in the normal state, in return for a constant
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increase in consumption of the emotion-relevant goods. The graphical rendering
assumes that the budget line (B) is the same in the calm and emotion state,
though as noted above, it is possible that the budget lines would diverge. The
emotion-state budget line might shift out or in-out, if the emotion makes
action cheaper (anger); in, if the emotion makes action more costly (grief). One
might assume that anger makes all actions cheaper, in which case the budget
line shifts out in a uniform manner. Alternatively, one might assume that the
emotion makes the emotion-relevant good cheaper, in which case the budget
line tilts, as it does when it represents a change in price.
When emotions make action cheaper, consumption of the emotion-relevant
good increases, and consumption of the other goods may either increase or
decrease. When emotions make action more costly, consumption of the two
kinds of goods may rise or fall. Even when emotions do not change the cost of
behavior, they do change preferences, so the pattern of consumption will
change. As a result, the agent's emotional behavior will usually put him on a
lower indifference curve measured by calm-state preferences (the exception
being when emotion reduces the cost of action by a sufficient amount). I will
call this change the emotion-provoked utility change (EPUC).
A person in the initial calm state knows that his emotional disposition might
get him in trouble or benefit him, depending on the environment. A person with
an irascible disposition might do well in a shame society: People avoid wronging him because they fear him. But he might do poorly in a well-regulated
society: A routine altercation might spiral into a fight, landing the agent in jail.
The first person has a positive expected EPUC; the second person has a negative
expected EPUC. (EPUC is defined only with reference to the emotion under
consideration; the same person might be easily disgusted or not, and this might
be beneficial in some contexts but not others.) The second person can be
expected to "invest" to minimize his actual EPUC: by cultivating a sense of
calm, or by avoiding places, like bars, where he is likely to be provoked.
It is important to emphasize that EPUC is determined by the calm-state
preferences, not the emotion-state preferences, even though it is generated by
actions taken during the emotion state. This is necessary in order to capture the
idea that people in their calm state are different from what they become in an
emotion state, and also that, anticipating this, people will "invest" during the
calm state.
At the investment stage, the agent knows that he will experience the stimulus
with some probability. To keep the analysis simple, let us suppose that during
the emotion state, preferences change but abilities and beliefs do not. The
difference between the agent's preferences during the calm state and the emotion state depends on the emotion's quality and intensity, which are reflected by
the slope of the emotion-state indifference curve. As can be seen in Figure 3, the
agent will typically consume a different bundle of goods during the emotion
state (E) and during the calm state (N), because of the change in preferences.
This means that after the emotion state has subsided and calm preferences have
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returned, the agent will be either worse off (as shown in Figure 3) or better off
than he had been in the calm state: We can construct a willingness-to-pay
(WTP) measure of the difference by constructing a hypothetical budget line in
the usual manner.22 In Figure 3, the agent would be willing to pay the amount
depicted in order to avoid the consumption results of the emotion state.2 3

''"'-i!

\UE

UN

B .....
.'....
UN'
EPUC

X

Figure 3: Measuring Emotional Outcomes
Ex ante, the agent knows that the change in consumption caused by the
emotional response will occur with some probability, and so initial investment
will reflect this expected change. Investment, in the current example, would be
to avoid the stimulus or 'cultivate a less sensitive disposition. Sometimes a
dollar of investment will be relatively effective (switching from one bar to
another) and sometimes not (developing an ability to turn the other cheek). The
effectiveness of the investment in this way will be denoted by the elasticity of
the emotional response with respect to the investment. A higher elasticity
indicates greater responsiveness. This allows us to make the following prediction: People will invest more in cultivating dispositions or avoiding stimuli as

22. Draw budget line B' tangent to the indifference curve UN', which intersects the bundle of goods
consumed in the emotion state, (E).
23. In Figure 3, the agent's emotion-state behavior results in the bundle of goods located at the
tangency of UE and B. This puts him on the lower calm-state indifference curve, UN'. To make him
indifferent between this bundle and the original calm-state outcome, the agent must be paid the amount
denoted by EPUC.
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(1) the quality of the emotion state differs from the calm state as its intensity
increases (that is, as EPUC increases), and (2) the elasticity of the emotion state
increases with respect to the investment.2 4
As an example, consider anger. Anger can occur in predictable and unpredictable ways. If the agent already hates a person, then she knows that if she
encounters that person, there is a good chance that she will become angry. By
contrast, an agent cannot predict when a stranger will offend her, and she might
suppose that her anger will be less likely to occur as a result of a random
incident involving a stranger than as a result of an encounter with someone she
already knows and hates. Thus, it makes more sense to punish people who are
provoked to anger by someone they hate and could avoid than to punish people
who are provoked to anger during a random encounter with a stranger. The
former are in a better position during their calm state to avoid the encounter,
and it is during the calm state that they are more responsive to incentives.
Suppose, instead, that an agent knows about his irascible disposition and has
taken a number of steps to change it. He attends anger management classes. He
avoids rowdy bars. He avoids drinking. Nonetheless, he is provoked to anger
and he injures the offender. It again makes sense to reduce the sanction in order
to reward and encourage his behavior during the calm state. By contrast, people
who cultivate angry dispositions should be punished.
D. OBJECTIONS

The approach I use loosely drapes the emotions over the rational choice
framework, rather than reducing emotions to matters of choice, or eschewing
rational choice altogether. The benefit of this approach is that it allows one to
incorporate emotions into the rational choice literature, rather than start afresh
on uncharted terrain.
Nonetheless, one can criticize the framework both for departing too much
and too little from the rational choice approach. The departure may be too much
because the assumption that preferences and other attributes change during
emotion states seriously weakens predictability. This seems to me unavoidable.
However, where the rational choice element remains is in (1) the insistence that
people remain rational during the emotion state, so that their behavior will bear
some resemblance to calm-state behavior, and remain responsive to incentives;
and (2) the insistence that people can anticipate and plan around their emotions,
by cultivating emotional dispositions and avoiding stimuli. This leaves some
room for predictions, as the discussion of criminal law below will show. But the
main advantage of the rational choice framework is not the generation of
predictions, but the stripping away of conceptual clutter, which allows a careful
analysis of the ways in which emotion changes the conclusions of existing
rational choice work. The framework also sheds light on the complex normative
24. A natural extension of this argument is that parents will inculcate the relevant emotional
dispositions in their children, at least to the extent that parents have their children's interests at heart.
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consequences of the fact that people, when calm, often disvalue their preferences while emotionally agitated and sometimes want their emotional behavior
to be restrained.
One can also argue that the framework departs too little from the rational
choice approach. It is clearly a simplification. Even during the calm state people
are affected by emotions. Just imagining the consequences of future actions
may provoke an emotional reaction that, though likely to be less intense than
the emotions that would be felt during the actions, is still strong enough to
affect deliberation, so that preferences may exhibit a muted instability even
during the calm state, with the choice of action dependent on the agent's
ever-changing imaginative resources. Further, after the emotion state is over,
recollection of the stimulus may provoke the emotion anew, and so every
emotion state may effect a permanent change in people's preferences. Finally, I
have acknowledged that the framework is more suitable for analyzing simpler
emotions, and not complex and durable emotions like love.
I have also ignored many difficult philosophical and psychological questions
about emotions. My justification is my focus on legal questions. Lengthy
discussion of philosophical and psychological questions would distract from the
conclusions about the law, and in any event, these questions are already handled
by many others. I should note in passing one philosophical issue that has been
the subject of prior legal analysis.2 6 This issue is the cognitive content of
emotion. Some people argue that emotions are constraints on cognition; certain
choices available to someone who is calm become unavailable when he is
subject to emotion. For example, it appears to be impossible not to jump back
from a striking snake. Others argue that emotions are themselves cognitive
evaluations of states of affairs: Grief about someone's death, for example,
represents a judgment about that person's value to the agent. The emotional
response involves an appraisal of the person's significance to the agent's
well-being. Most of my conclusions assume that emotions have some cognitive
component-that emotional responses involve choices based on emotion-state
preferences-but I do not mean to take sides in this debate.2 7
25. See infra Parts V, VI, VII.
26. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 10, at 275-301.
27. Most psychologists agree that some emotional reactions seem to involve no or minimal cognitive
content. For example, because there appears to be a direct pathway from the retina, which absorbs light,
to the hypothalamus, which is involved in emotional arousal, it is possible that a change in the light
may generate fear without any cognitive processing. See R. B. Zajonc, On the Primacy of Affect, 39
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 117, 119 (1984). But most psychologists also believe that many emotional reactions
involve cognitive processing of the stimuli. For two early contributions to this debate, compare R. B.
Zajonc, Feeling and Thinking: Preferences Need No Inferences, 35 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 151 (1980)
(taking the noncognitive view), with Richard S. Lazarus, Thoughts on the Relations Between Emotion
and Cognition, 37 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1019 (1982) (taking the cognitive view). A useful discussion of
the debate is in IzARD, supra note 7, at 35-40. There is also a rich philosophical literature on this topic.
See, e.g., Martha C. Nussbaum, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT: A THEORY OF THE EMOTIONS (forthcoming Oct.
2001) (advancing a highly cognitivist view of the emotions); John Deigh, Cognitivism in the Theory of
Emotions, 104 ETHICS 824 (1994) (surveying the literature).
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One charge that cannot be ignored is that the rational choice approach is
internally inconsistent. This argument is implicit in Elster's discussion of
Becker's model of guilt, in which guilt is assumed to be a cost resulting from
the violation of a preference not to feel guilt.28 Elster argues:
If guilt were nothing but an anticipated or experienced cost, an agent whose
guilt deters him from stealing or retaining [a] book should be willing to buy a
guilt-erasing pill if it was sufficiently cheap. I submit that no person who is
capable of being deterred by guilt would buy the pill. In fact, he would feel
guilty about buying it. For him, taking the pill in order to escape guilt and be
29
able to steal the book would be as morally bad as just stealing it.
To see the problem with this argument, imagine that the agent has a moral
dilemma. He must betray his lover or his country, and in either event, he will
feel tremendous guilt. Once he has made the decision, a desire to behave
morally does not require the agent to continue to endure the guilt (which may be
overwhelming, paralyzing), and surely he should be permitted to take the pill.
Indeed, some people recognize that their overwhelming sense of guilt (which
they attribute to factors outside themselves, such as a psychologically destructive upbringing) prevents them from doing good things, and would take the pill
without becoming, or believing themselves to be, immoral and without losing
the capacity to act morally. That shame and guilt can be paralyzing and
destructive, at both the individual and social level, is a recurring theme in
psychology. 30 The source of Elster's confusion is his entanglement of moral and
emotional motivation. A moral person does not want to behave immorally, but
he may want to have greater control over his emotions when otherwise his
emotions would lead him morally or prudentially astray.
The difference between emotion and morality is clearer when one moves
from guilt to other emotions. Consider a skillful doctor who is paralyzed by
disgust during surgery, or a soldier or police officer who knows that his fearful
disposition endangers other people. Surely, these people can, without selfcontradiction, take pills that reduce or eliminate their ability to experience
disgust or fear.
III.

EMOTION IN CRIMINAL LAW

It is sometimes said that a person who commits a crime under the influence of
emotion is less culpable than a person who acts calmly and deliberately. The

28. See BECKER, supra note 2, at 152-55.
29. ELSTER, supra note 6, at 303.
30. See, e.g., David W. Harder, Shame and Guilt Assessment, and Relationships of Shame- and
Guilt-Pronenessto Psychopathology, in SELF-CONSCIOUS EMOTIONS: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SHAME, GUILT,

EMBARRASSMENT, AND PRIDE 368 (June Price Tangney & Kurt W. Fischer eds., 1995) (discussing the
relationship between shame and guilt, and psychological disorders such as depression, substance abuse,
suicide, and delinquency).
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standard example is the reduction of murder to voluntary manslaughter if the
defendant acted in an uncontrollable rage. But the truth is more complex.
Certain emotion states reduce murder to voluntary manslaughter, but others do
not. For example, under modem hate crime laws a person who kills a gay man
because he "hates" gays or is "disgusted" by gays will be found more culpable
than someone who kills the same man to get his wallet. This raises the question
of whether the criminal law's different treatments of emotion-influenced crime
can be explained on deterrence grounds.
There are two relevant considerations in a deterrence approach to emotional
crimes. The first consideration is the extent to which an agent in an emotion
state is responsive to sanctions. The second consideration is the extent to which
an agent can be deterred from being in the emotional state in situations in which
that state may lead to harm.
A. EMOTION-STATE DETERRABILITY

A person in an emotion state may be sensitive to sanctions. Deterrability
depends both on the type of emotion and its intensity. In the emotion state, a
person experiences a heightened preference, relative to the calm state, to
"consume" the emotion-relevant good. However, the person has other preferences as well. An angry person wants to strike the offender, but many angry
people restrain themselves because they continue to want their freedom, their
job, their assets, and the other good things they might lose if convicted of
assault or murder. But even putting this aside it is important to realize that most
emotions-anger is the conspicuous exception-do not create a powerful preference to harm another person. Disgust typically involves a preference to withdraw, not to attack, and that is why disgust rarely excuses assault or murder.
Fear typically involves a preference to flee or freeze, not to attack, though
attacking may be a reaction in some cases, and panic may lead to harm when
the agent is responsible for the care of a child or incompetent person. Although
a disgusted or fearful person's indifference curve will tilt dramatically, it does
not tilt in the direction of injuring another person; indeed, that preference will
become weak relative to the desire to escape the stimulus.
In addition, a person's emotion state can be more or less extreme relative to
the calm state. A person can be made more or less angry by a provocation. A
mere insult will, on average, anger a person less than an unprovoked slap on the
face. A slightly angry person will suppress the desire to lash out if the consequences are more than trivial,. and may, if at all, indulge his preference by
complaining about the offender to a third party.
Both these observations explain why, from a deterrence perspective, being in
an emotion state is not a sufficient condition for reduced culpability. It makes
sense to reduce the sanction for an act committed during an emotion state if (1)
the emotion is anger (or another emotion that causes people to injure others, like
fear, possibly) and it is quite intense, so that high expected sanctions cannot
deter the behavior, and (2) the sanctions are costly, which they are when they
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involve imprisonment.3 ' The justification is that expensive sanctions should not
be wasted on people who cannot be deterred by them.32
B. PRE-EMOTION (CALM) STATE DETERRABILITY

Imagine that a person in an emotion state is undeterrable. The sanction cannot be made high enough to prevent him from acting. It does not
follow that he must be excused from a crime that follows from the action
tendency.
To see why, one must observe that a person in the calm state often
foresees the stimuli that will provoke the emotion state and also his actions
in the emotion state. The calm-state preferences might very well reflect
some things (a long-term desire to stay out of jail) and not other things (an
immediate desire to strike an offender) that are the reverse in the emotion
state. Thus, acting on his calm-state preferences the person might take
precautions against entering the emotion state, including cultivating more
peaceful emotions or avoiding the stimulus, though he will not take
such precautions if he thinks that his irascibility produces returns valued in
the calm state, including a reputation for toughness. For this reason, sanctions may be desirable for influencing investment behavior during the calm
state.
Reducing the sanction for emotion-state behavior, relative to calm-state
behavior, is justified even though the sanction does not deter emotion-state
behavior when (1) the calm-state preferences and emotion-state preferences
differ only a little (EPUC is low), (2) the agent cannot avoid the stimulus or
reduce the intensity of his emotional reaction at relatively low cost (elasticity is low), and (3) sanctions are expensive (incarceration, not fines). (Note
that this puts aside the incapacitation goal of imprisonment, which may
justify imprisoning dangerous people who engage in undeterrable conduct.)
The first factor essentially refers to the benefit the agent obtains by avoiding
the emotion state; the second factor refers to the cost of avoiding the
emotion state.
Table 1 summarizes the argument so far:

31. Cf. Richard A. Posner, Emotion Versus Emotionalism in Law, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW, supra
note 1, at 312-13 [hereinafter Posner, Emotion] (arguing that unemotional murder should receive a
higher sanction, compared to emotional murder, to the extent that the emotional murderer is less
dangerous and easier to catch, but a lower sanction, to the extent that people in the grip of emotion are
less deterrable); see also Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L.
REv. 1193, 1223 (1985) (positing that "the fact that a given increment of punishment will deter the
impulsive criminal less than the deliberate one could actually point to heavier punishment for the
former").
32. I put aside the benefits derived from incapacitation, and also the benefits from discouraging
provocation by victims. For a discussion on such benefits, see Alon Harel, Efficiency and Fairness in
Criminal Law: The Case for a Criminal Principle of Comparative Fault, 82 CAL. L. REv. 1181,
1211-17 (1994).
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Table 1
emotion-state deterrability
high

pre-emotion-state
deterrability

high
low

low

greater punishment
lesser punishment

Table 1 shows that the strongest case for reducing criminal punishment on
deterrence grounds occurs when the agent cannot be easily deterred in the
emotion state and cannot easily avoid the emotion state either by avoiding the
stimulus or changing her temperament.33 The emotion has to be the right type
(anger or fear, typically), and it must be intense. When these conditions are not
met, the case for reducing the punishment is weaker.
C. SOME EXAMPLES

Murder is reduced to voluntary manslaughter not just when the Wrongdoer
acts under the influence of emotion. The emotion usually must be anger, not
(say) disgust. Anger causes people to attack others; disgust causes them to
withdraw. The anger must be intense, not mild; a provocation that would excuse
murder in the heat of passion does not excuse murder committed after the
passage of time.34 Distinctions regarding the adequacy of provocation can be
understood in terms of the elasticity of investment. People who kill adulterous
spouses can hardly be expected to avoid the stimulus. But people who look for
trouble in bars, especially homophobes who look for trouble in gay bars, could
easily avoid the provocation that leads to murderous rage. Kahan and Nussbaum
want to put women who kill brutal husbands and men who kill adulterous wives
or girlfriends in the same category as murderous homophobes,35 so that they
can argue that the law's inconsistent treatment of homophobes and these other

33. Again, I put aside incapacitation.
34. E.g., People v. Ashland, 128 P. 798, 802-03 (Cal. Ct. App. 1912). Roman law permitted a father
to kill his adulterous daughter, but only if (1) he surprised her during the sexual activities; (2) he killed
her and her lover ("by one blow and one attack, with equal anger against both"); and (3) killed
immediately-"in other words, in a fit of rage caused by the discovery of the illicit relationship." Eva
Cantarella, Homicides of Honor: The Development of Italian Adultery Law Over Two Millennia, in THE
FAMILY IN ITALY: FROM ANTIQurrY TO THE PRESENT 229 (David I. Kertzer & Richard P. Saller eds., 1991).
A man who killed his wife's lover could escape punishment only if he subsequently divorced his wife;
otherwise, "he could be accused of pimping." Id. at 234. The law clearly made the emotion state-the
fit of rage-a condition of excuse, and the various restrictions interfered with efforts to feign rage or
rationalize a cold-blooded murder as an emotional act. The defense of rage was plausible only when the
conditions under which rage usually resulted were met; idiosyncratic emotional responses, not justified
by the degree of the insult, would not do. Thus, at one point, the killing could go unpunished only if the
adultery occurred in the father's or the husband's house (a grave insult), rather than elsewhere. Id. at
231-32.
35. Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 10, at 311.
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wrongdoers contradicts the deterrence argument. But the abused woman and the
wronged husband, unlike the murderous homophobe, can be placed in the
southeast or southwest box of Table 1.36 Both cases involve low pre-emotionstate deterrability. The abused woman cannot-except at a great personal
cost-leave the abusive man, or so the proponents of the battered woman
defense argue.37 The wronged husband has no way of anticipating that his wife
is being unfaithful. Neither can realistically be expected to invest, while calm,
in avoiding the stimulus or cultivating a peaceful disposition. By contrast, the
homophobe can relatively easily avoid gay bars and other places where gay
people congregate, and thus can be placed in the northwest or northeast boxes
of Table 1.
Similar comments apply to the case of fear. Louise Woodward, who was
hired as a nanny, was found guilty of killing the infant in her care, but the trial
judge reduced a verdict of second-degree murder to manslaughter on the ground
that the evidence disclosed "confusion, fright, a bad judgment, rather than rage
or malice." 3 8 Supposing that Woodward really panicked, the explanation for
reducing the conviction is that sanctions do not deter people who are gripped by
fear, and although most panicking people do not attack others, it is possible that
a terrified caregiver might injure a child. One might argue that severe sanctions
would deter fear-prone people from becoming nannies, but fear-induced killing
is so rare and bizarre that the elasticity of investment with respect to fear must
be considered quite low. Should the convicted killer take on a new position as a
nanny, however, and while panicking kill that child as well, one would anticipate a very high sanction.
Not all emotions reduce the sanction. Hate crime laws increase, rather than
reduce sanctions, even though the racist killer more plausibly acted under the
influence of emotion than, say, the contract killer. The reason that hate results in
greater punishment, while anger often results in a lesser punishment, is that hate
is more susceptible to pre-emotion-state manipulation than anger is. The person
who hates members of a particular race can often avoid interacting with them;
he can also take care not to carry weapons. The person provoked to anger by
adultery is not in a similar position. The two emotions differ on the dimension
of elasticity.

36. Whether the case should be placed in the southeast or southwest box depends on the case.
Traditionally, it was thought that the enraged husband is not deterrable; however, it depends on context.
For example, an enraged husband may have a chance to cool off while searching for a weapon.
Resistance to the battered woman defense may have been based on uncertainty about whether a fearful
person is driven to kill. Fearful people usually run away. But it has been argued that the battered woman
is psychologically unable to flee, or has no place to flee. A person who is scared and cornered lashes
out. This argument is more closely attuned to intuitions about emotion.
37. See generally Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in
Current Reform Proposals,140 U. PA. L. REV. 379 (1991).
38. See Samuel H. Pillsbury, Harlan, Holmes, and the Passions of Justice, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW,
supra note 1, at 355.
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Turning now to the defense of duress, Kahan and Nussbaum ask us to
compare Woman 1-who commits armed robbery to avoid being beaten upand Woman 2-who fails to protect her child in order to avoid being beaten up.
Woman 1 has a duress defense; Woman 2 does not. Kahan and Nussbaum say
that this is inconsistent with the "narrow consequentialist" view that people who
are susceptible only to extreme threats do not pose a danger to others, so
punishment would be wasteful. 39 But the law makes sense on deterrence
grounds. Sanctioning Woman 1 is not likely to change behavior because a
person gripped by fear develops a strong preference for self-preservation and
ordinary altruistic concerns diminish. But ordinary experience suggests that
altruism for one's own child remains salient even for a scared person. When we
are threatened, we run away if alone, but grab our children if they are with us. If
this is not true for Woman 2, then a heavy sanction might offset her subjective
gain, and it is no more surprising that we punish her than it is that we punish
anyone who engages in child abuse. Kahan and Nussbaum claim that a consequentialist argument assumes that legal decisionmakers "are prepared to endorse the first woman's valuation of her own welfare but not the second
woman's." 40 But this is not right. We want neither woman to commit a crime,
but we punish the first woman less because a sanction is less likely to deter her.
A final point is that the criminal law should vary from region to region if
there is cross-cultural variation in average emotional disposition. Nisbett and
Cohen provide experimental evidence that in the United States, southerners are
more easily provoked to anger by an insult than northerners.4 1 If, as seems
likely, the elasticity of investment with respect to anger states is low, then we
would expect southern states to punish crimes committed while angry and in
response to provocation to a lesser degree than northern states, holding constant
the cost of imprisonment. Because southerners are less likely to respond to
sanctions while angry, already take more care to avoid provocation, and are
unlikely to be able to modify dispositions that are mostly the result of upbringing, scarce prison resources are better devoted in the South to deterring other
crimes than in the North.42
D. A NOTE ON TORT

The analysis of emotion in tort law is similar to the analysis for criminal law.
Suppose that an individual must drive to work every day but is subject to, and

39. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 10, at 335.
40. Id. at 336.
41. NiSBET7 & COHEN, supra note 12, at 50-53.
42. Indeed, southern states are more tolerant of domestic violence than northern states, id. at 66,
which is consistent with the claim that states would not devote prison resources to crimes that cannot
easily be deterred. Nisbett and Cohen point out that southern states are more likely to carry out capital
punishment than northern states, id. at 70, but they do not relate this statistic to provocations. I
conjecture that capital punishment and other extreme punishments are less likely to be imposed in the
South when murders are provoked by insults.
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knows himself subject to, road rage when other drivers cut him off. The
individual drives more carelessly while under the influence of road rage than
when he is calm. Formally, his emotion-state preference to drive quickly is
more intense than his calm-state preference to drive quickly (or, alternatively,
the cost of driving carefully increases). For concreteness, suppose that the
individual's cost of driving carefully is $100 when enraged, but the cost is only
$10 when the individual is calm. Further, suppose that the social cost of driving
quickly is $50 in expected accident costs imposed on third parties. A negligence
rule, narrowly applied, would excuse the enraged driver from liability, whereas
strict liability would require him to pay $50 in expected terms. Strict liability is
the superior rule, for it would encourage the calm-state person, who is stuck
with the $50 liability imposed on him by his emotion-state self, to switch to
public transportation or avoid congested streets where road rage is more likely
provoked. Alternatively, the individual could be held negligent for not taking
public transportation when he knows himself subject to road rage, just as an
epileptic is held liable for driving with knowledge of his epilepsy. 43 The latter
alternative achieves the same result as strict liability by counterfactually attributing calm-state abilities and preferences to the emotion-state self that causes the
accident. 44
IV. JURIES
There is a widespread view that jurors should deliberate calmly, rather than in
a state of emotion. This is why judges should not admit prejudicial evidence,
which includes evidence that may excite the emotions.4 5 This view also is
behind academic resistance to victim impact statements. But there is an alternative view. Some critics of capital punishment argue that the current sentencing
practices suppress jurors' natural empathetic reaction to the defendant's position.4 6 These critics seem to argue that emotion should play a role in capital
sentencing. 47 And defenders of punitive damages often say that this remedy is
an appropriate form of expressing outrage at the defendant's conduct.
To understand this debate, one needs a clear view of what juries are supposed
to do. For simplicity, let us focus on the problem of determining liability. Juries
are supposed to determine whether a civil plaintiff has proved her case to be

43. A person will not ordinarily be held negligent if he crashes during a heart attack, epileptic
seizure, or insane delusion, unless he knows about the condition in advance, in which case he is
expected to take precautions, like not driving or taking drugs. See, e.g., Breunig v. Am. Family Ins. Co.,
173 N.W.2d 619, 623 (Wis. 1970).
44. This interpretation of negligence is more consistent with judicial practice than the narrow
interpretation. The reasonable man standard forbids inquiry into idiosyncratic inability to comply with
the standard of care.
45. See FED. R. EviD. 403.
46. See Craig Haney, Violence and the CapitalJury: Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement and the
Impulse to Condemn to Death, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1447, 1485-86 (1997); Dan M. Kahan, The Anatomy of
Disgust in CriminalLaw, 96 MIcH. L. REV. 1621, 1626 (1998).
47. See Haney, supra note 46, at 1453-54.
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more likely than not. Let us take a simple negligence case in which the only
relevant variables are (to simplify again) the defendant's precaution, the probability of the harm given that precaution, and the actual harm.
Suppose that the plaintiff wants to show the jury a photograph of the victim's
gruesome injuries. The photograph would predictably elicit a feeling of disgust
among the jurors. They will look but avert their faces, feel nausea, and so forth.
Let us suppose the feeling of disgust lingers through their deliberations, perhaps
because the deliberations involve continual examination of the photograph or
they provoke memories of the photograph and with them the sensation of
disgust. The question is whether these feelings are likely to interfere with the
jury's ability to evaluate precautions, probabilities, and harms.
The answer is probably no. The action tendency of disgust is withdrawal
from the object and is felt most strongly in the presence of that object. During
that limited period of time, the agent's normal cognitive capacities may be
short-circuited. But the farther removed the object is, the less intense the action
tendency is, and the more likely the agent is to take account of the rest of the
world. This is true even if the image of the disgusting object renews itself in the
agent's mind as he deliberates about the appropriate outcome of the case.
Moreover, because disgust does not cause people to want to punish, it does not
seem likely that a disgusted jury will react by exaggerating the harm imposed
on the victim and awarding incorrect damages.
The photograph might also provoke anger or horror. These emotions are more
troublesome. If the jurors feel anger at the defendant, they might want to punish
him, even though the repulsiveness of the injury has nothing to do with the
defendant's culpability. A merely negligent defendant whose tort severely disfigures the victim should not be forced to pay more than a reckless defendant
whose tort has purely pecuniary consequences or less disfiguring physical
consequences, holding the extent of the harm constant. It is not clear, though,
that jurors would make this error. Their anger is not based on a personal insult
against them, but is more akin to the indignation that one feels on learning of a
wrong. But indignation does not result in the same tendency to inflict harm.4 8
On the other hand, some experimental evidence suggests that people in a state
of anger or outrage will punish the defendant more harshly than they would
otherwise, even though they are not directly harmed. 49 This concern, that

48. See WILLIAM IAN MILLER, THE ANATOMY OF DISGUST 188-93 (1997); Martha C. Nussbaum,
"Secret Sewers of Vice": Disgust, Bodies, and the Law, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW, supra note 1, at 19,
26-29.
49. This was true even if the anger or outrage was provoked by events (like a movie) that were
irrelevant to the case. See generally Brian H. Bornstein & Robert J. Nemeth, Jurors' Perception of
Violence: A Framework for Inquiry, 4 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 77 (1991) (summarizing
research); Julie H. Goldberg, Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock, Rage and Reason: The Psychology
of the Intuitive Prosecutor,29 EUR. J. Soc. PsYCHOL. 781 (1999); Saul M. Kassin & David A. Garfield,
Blood and Guts: General and Trial-Specific Effects of Videotaped Crime Scenes on Mock Jurors, 21
J. APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 1459 (1991) (explaining that exposure to crime scene videotape increased
bias against defendant in mock juror experiments); Jennifer S. Lerner, Julie H. Goldberg & Philip E.
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"blood will have blood," seems to lie behind judicial decisions to exclude gory
photographs. 5 °
Can emotions improve the jury's ability to make a correct judgment? It is
tempting to think so, because emotions are often adaptive. A standard argument
about fear, for example, is that it enables an organism to escape threats. If the
flight response is often inaccurate, resulting in fear when a threat is not actually
present, false positives are, in this context, less important than false negatives. 5 '
The problem with this argument is that the law takes account of problems of
proof with evidentiary and procedural rules and assumes that the jury will
simply make its best judgment. To continue with our example, emotion will not
improve the jury's ability to determine the cost of the defendant's precaution or
the likelihood that the precaution would produce the injury complained of.
Emotion will not improve the jury's ability to measure medical costs, financial
losses, and similar measurable harms. Also, it seems likely, though the issue is
more arguable, that emotion will not improve the jury's ability to measure pain
and suffering. Although a gory photograph might bring home to a jury the
extent of the injury and the fear it might have produced, there is no reason for
thinking that the jury's response will be accurate. The jury that does not see the
photograph might underestimate the pain, and the jury that sees the photograph
might overestimate the pain, but there is no reason to believe that one estimate
will be closer to the truth than the other. And to the extent that the gory
photograph helps the jury estimate the pain, this should be understood as a
cognitive improvement brought about by increased information. The horror of
the situation depicted, if it results in outrage, is likely to produce erratic
awards. 52
Tetlock, Sober Second Thought: The Effects of Accountability, Anger, and Authoritarianismon Attributions of Responsibility, 24 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULLETIN 563 (1998). For some work on juries
and emotion, see Reid Hastie, David A. Schkade & John W. Payne, JurorJudgments in Civil Cases:
Effects on Plaintiff's Requests and Plaintiff's Identity on Punitive Damage Awards, 23 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 445 (1999); Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman & David Schkade, Assessing Punitive
Damages, 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2095-97 (1998) (arguing that feelings of outrage account for awards of
punitive damages in experimental settings) [hereinafter Sunstein, Kahneman & Schkade, Assessing
Punitive Damages]; Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade & Daniel Kahneman, Do People Want Optimal
Deterrence?, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 237, 248 (2000) (same); W. Kip Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis: A
Reckless Act?, 52 STAN. L. REv. 547, 586-90 (2000) (finding that punitive damages rise when
corporations engage in cost-benefit analysis). In Edward L. Glaeser & Bruce Sacerdote, The Determinants of Punishment: Deterrence, Incapacitation, and Vengeance (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 7676, 2000), the authors speculate that vengeance explains why sentences for
vehicular homicide increase when the victim is a woman, which is inconsistent with the economic
theory of crime.
50. See, e.g., United States v. Rezaq, 134 F.3d 1121, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH, act 3, sc. 4, and translating into legalese: "photographs of gore may inappropriately dispose a jury to exact retribution"); Campbell v. Keystone Aerial Surveys, Inc., 138 F.3d 996 (5th
Cir. 1998) (excluding photograph of burned and mutilated corpse); Navarro de Cosme v. Hosp. Pavia,
922 F.2d 926, 930-31 (lst Cir. 1991) (affirming exclusion of photograph of decomposing corpse of
fetus in medical malpractice case).
51. See Ohman, supra note 13, at 520.
52. See Sunstein, Kahneman & Schkade, Assessing Punitive Damages, supra note 49, at 2100-04.
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These considerations bear on the debate on the use of victim impact statements in capital sentencing. Proponents of the use of these statements argue that
by creating pity for the victim and the victim's family, the statements counterbalance the natural sympathy that jurors feel for the criminal defendant, whose
presence in the courtroom gives him an empathic advantage. Opponents argue
that the statements distract the jury with irrelevant information and inflame it
against the defendant.53 If the purpose of capital punishment is to deter murder
or incapacitate murderers, then pity and outrage are surely irrelevant to capital
sentencing. The only relevant consideration is the dangerousness of the criminal, something that can be evaluated without emotional involvement. Jurors
gripped by fear, pity, or outrage will overestimate or underestimate the danger
posed by the defendant. To banish these emotions, victim impact statements like
other forms of evidence should contain only relevant facts. There is no reason
why victim impact statements should be treated differently from other forms of
evidence; they should be permitted unless their prejudicial effects outweigh
their relevance. 54
Little else can be said at this high level of abstraction, but empirical testing
would shed light on these issues. It is common in psychological research to test
the effect of emotions on decisionmakers by "priming" subjects with emotionprovoking stimuli.55 One possible experiment would involve giving mock tort
or criminal cases to subjects, and asking them to determine liability or guilt, and
damages or punishment. The control group would be given a verbal description
of the tort or crime; the other group would be given the same description plus a
gory picture. One predicts that the latter group would be more likely to find
liability or guilt, and more likely to award higher damages or to impose harsher
sentences. One could test the extent to which emotions interfere with or
promote accuracy by ensuring that there is a correct legal answer (for example,
award compensatory damages, stipulate that the victim felt no pain and did not
suffer in any way, and provide a formula for determining damages). One could
also test the effect of gory versus non-gory photographs, for example, by
showing the photograph of a mutilated corpse and the photograph of a non53. The positions are detailed in Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 496 (1986) (holding that victim
impact statements in capital sentencing violated the Eighth Amendment), overruled by Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
54. On the emotional involvement of jurors in capital sentencing, see Stephen P. Garvey, The
Emotional Economy of CapitalSentencing, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 26 (2000). Garvey found that jurors were
more likely to vote for death (in the first vote) when they felt anger or rage toward the defendant and
less likely when they felt pity or sympathy-both with statistical significance. See id. There was no
statistically significant correlation between disgust and the likelihood of voting for death. Id. at 63; see
also Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 361,
390-410 (1996) (criticizing victim impact statements for appealing to vengeance and hatred, which
interfere with proper evaluation of the defendant's conduct); Posner, Emotion, supra note 31, at 325-27
(defending victim impact statements to prevent distortion of "empathetic consideration," which would
occur given that defendants can provide evidence intended to elicit mercy from the jury).
55. See, e.g., Goldberg, Lerner & Tetlock, supra note 49 (priming by having subjects watch
outrage-inducing movie); Lerner, Goldberg & Tetlock, supra note 49 (same).
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mutilated corpse. An issue of interest is whether a jury punishes criminal or
civil defendants who engage in exactly the same amount of harm, on the
morally and legally irrelevant basis of whether the harm is bloody or otherwise
disgusting or horrifying.
Another potential experiment would test the claim that disgust, unlike anger,
has little influence on jurors' deliberation. The key here is to use a photograph
that is disgusting but unlikely to provoke anger, because the defendant is not
responsible for the harm. Suppose, for example, that an insurance company
must pay an insured an amount that will compensate her for the loss of her
husband's earnings after the husband dies in an accident. The sole issue at trial
is that of calculating the loss. Let that calculation involve the valuation of a
number of imponderables. Though one would expect variation in the awards,
my claims about disgust imply that jurors shown a photograph of the mangled
corpse would not systematically award higher amounts than jurors who are
given a verbal description.
V.

COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND RISK REGULATION

In a recent article, Timur Kuran and Cass Sunstein argue that cognitive biases
can lead to panicked government action that is socially hannful. 56 They focus
on the availability heuristic, "a pervasive mental shortcut whereby the perceived
likelihood of any given event is tied to the ease with which its occurrence can
be brought to mind."' 7 Because people rely on the availability heuristic and
other cognitive shortcuts, they fear risks not solely on the basis of the expected
harm, but on the basis of irrelevant factors such as the degree to which the risks
are subject to public discussion, the harm is vivid, the technology is new, the
results are irreversible, and so forth. In the meantime, dissenting views are
ignored. Dissenters are treated with opprobrium, and so dissent is suppressed.
As a consequence, initially exaggerated beliefs about risks can feed on each
other, resulting in an "availability cascade," in which a minor risk is blown up
into a major threat. Kuran and Sunstein's main examples are the Love Canal
scare, the Alar scare, and the response to the crash of TWA Flight 800. In all
these cases, a relatively trivial risk or benign explanation is overtaken by events,
resulting in a panic in which the worst case is widely believed.
A notable aspect of Kuran and Sunstein's explanation is that it is purely
cognitive: People are assumed to be rational except to the extent that cognitive
biases interfere with rational choice. Their argument predicts that availability
cascades would occur even in a hypothetical world in which people had no
emotions. But there are some reasons for being skeptical of this view. Start with
the semantic point that Love Canal, and similar events, are often called "scares"
or "panics." Kuran and Sunstein's account of the Love Canal affair repeatedly
56. See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L.
REV. 683, 735-46 (1999).
57. Id. at 685.
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notes the emotional character of the events: "frightening tales spread quickly" ;5
"residents feared" various dangers; 59 "[a]ngered by claims in" a newspaper, one
resident organized a petition drive;6 ° a woman at a meeting "started crying
hysterically"; 6 1 "[h]er anxieties and fears came to be shared by the entire
community" ;62 one activist was "furious .... Now very emotional, I said: 'You
64
can't do that! That would be murder!' ,;63 "fears would not dissipate."
Although Kuran and Sunstein could argue that the emotional responses were
epiphenomenal, and that cognitive bias fully explains the phenomenon, the role
of emotion cannot be discounted. Most panics, as the term suggests, are
characterized by fear.
It was mentioned earlier that many psychologists regard fear as an evolutionarily adaptive mechanism for processing information about potential threats to
the organism. It is evolutionarily more costly for an organism to fail to respond
to a threat than it is for the organism to respond incorrectly. 65 That is, you are
less likely to survive and reproduce if you sometimes neglect to flee from a tiger
than if you occasionally flee from a shadow that looks like a tiger. Certain
genetically determined or learned stimuli (such as a fear of snakes) are processed in a rough way by a part of the brain before being subject to cognition, a
bit like the reflex action of withdrawing one's hand from a hot object.66 Thus,
fear (and anxiety as well) has benefits and costs; it allows the organism to
respond quickly to a threat, but it also appears to cause the organism to
overestimate the probability of the threat.
The connection between an individual's fear and a social panic occurs as
follows: First, fear is contagious. A person who observes that another person is
fearful is more likely to become fearful than a person who does not make such
an observation. This may be rational in a sense, but it also seems to be a purely
psychological or even physiological response.67 Second, fear feeds on itself.
Upon observing that another is fearful, one may experience heightened fear of
one's own. Third, fear, unlike an emotion such as anger, can persist for quite a
long time, sometimes in the form of a general anxiety. Fearful and anxious
people continue to overestimate the probability of a threat and to reinforce each
other's incorrect beliefs.
The emotion perspective can be seen as a supplement to Kuran and Sunstein's cognitive theory, which indeed itself can be seen as a supplement to a

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 691-92.
Id. at 692.
Id.
Id. at 693.
Id. at 692.

63. Id. at 693 (quoting Lois MARIE GIBBS, LOVE CANAL: THE STORY CONTINUES

.

.. 30 (1998)).

64. Id. at 694.
65. Ohman, supra note 13, at 520.
66. See id.
67. See generally ELAINE HATFIELD ET AL., EMOTIONAL CONTAGION (1994) (discussing the conditions
under which emotions spread among individuals).
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rational choice view based on information imperfections. It is rational to infer
that a threat exists if others believe that a threat exists and these others have
information unavailable to the subject.6 8 This inference may be strengthened by
the availability heuristic, a cognitive bias. And the inference may be strengthened further by the emotion of fear, which leads the fearful individual to
exaggerate (relative to calm-state beliefs) not any widely publicized risk (as
suggested by the availability heuristic), but in particular, those risks that pose
threats that engage the fear-centered portions of the brain.
This last observation leads to the question of normative implications. Kuran
and Sunstein's analysis of availability cascades leads them to call for greater
insulation of decisionmakers, greater reliance on scientists and other experts,
and greater use of analytic tools like cost-benefit analysis. 69 These are surely
appropriate responses when panics are the result of fear as well as cognitive
biases. But it also would be useful to know whether different panics have
different explanations, and therefore justify different government responses. A
bank panic, for example, is calm-state rational. Given that the bank's liabilities
exceed its liquid assets, I am rational to withdraw my money if I believe others
will withdraw their money. Bank panics would occur even if people never made
cognitive errors or experienced intense emotions. This may explain why bank
panics are so easily ended: The government just needs to make a credible
promise to reimburse all depositors.
By contrast, the preference for driving over flying appears to be emotion
driven. I conjecture that people are more anxious about flying than about
driving because when danger provokes fear, driving does not prevent one from
fleeing (one pulls over to the shoulder) but flying does (one is stuck in the
airborne aircraft).
A frequent criticism of aggressive airline safety regulation is that costly
precautions cause people to substitute to automobiles for short trips, which in
fact are more dangerous, so certain airline safety regulations may increase
fatalities rather than reduce them.70 An objection to this argument is that
people's subjective discomfort with airline travel should be counted as a social
cost. Although airline, safety regulation may increase aggregate fatalities as
people substitute to automobiles because of cost, it may still increase social
welfare as the travelers experience less emotional discomfort.
The problem with this response is that fear, dread, and anxiety are not
sensitive to changes in low probabilities. 71 A person who feels an overpowering

68. See, e.g., Abhijit V. Benerjee, A Simple Model of Herd Behavior, 107 Q. J. EcON. 797, 815
(1992).
69. Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 56, at 746-60.
70. Robert W. Hahn, The Economics of Airline Safety and Security:An Analysis of the White House
Commission's Recommendations, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'v 791, 804-07 (1997) (arguing that
proposed regulation requiring infant seats in airplanes would increase the number of fatalities by
causing people to switch to driving for short trips).
71. See Loewenstein et al., supra note 4, at 18.

HeinOnline -- 89 Geo. L.J. 2004 2000-2001

2001]

LAW AND THE EMOTIONS

2005

feeling of dread while riding on an airplane will feel the same amount of dread
whether the probability of an accident is 1 in 1,000,000 or 1 in 10,000,000. So
the safety precaution does not increase that person's subjective well-being
beyond the reduction of risk. If the person rationally anticipates her dread, she
will treat it as a fixed cost regardless of the probability of accident (within
constraints, obviously), so her determination whether to fly or drive will depend
entirely on the pecuniary costs. This observation rescues the standard criticism
of safety regulation from the objection; subjective (emotional) discomfort should
not play a critical role in safety regulation.72
As another example of what is at stake, consider the problem of genetically
altered food, which is widely avoided in Europe. On the rational herding view,
individuals in Europe avoid this food because others avoid this food. Each
person, individually rationally but collectively disastrously, infers that every
person acts on statistically independent pieces of information. The reason that
this story is probably false is that in the herd behavior models, the suboptimal
equilibria are fragile.73 If genetically altered food poses risks no greater than
those that people already face, and if people were rational, then the panic would
not have lasted as long as it has.7 4

There is likely some truth to the cognitive view of this panic. Concerns about
genetically altered food probably stem from the mad cow disease problem in
England, which was a salient event.7 5 But we know that emotional reactions
often interfere with cognition. The argument in favor of genetic alteration of
food-the method is not much different from the breeding that has occurred for
thousands of years-does not stick in people's minds, and it may be that it does
not for the same reason that a person will not drink out of a sterilized cup that
had once been used to hold urine. This argument requires a jump from the
primal fear or disgust response, to a more complex, culturally mediated fear/
disgust response; a response about which little is known. But it is a reasonable
hypothesis.
The cognition and emotion theories leave much unexplained. If the British
had all become vegetarians in response to mad cow disease, the theories could
have rationalized that response as well. This methodological difficulty does not
alter the fact that it matters which view is correct. Consider the question
whether it is appropriate for automobile manufacturers to install switches that
allow consumers to deactivate air bags. Reluctance about permitting these

72. See Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When Preferences
Are Distorted, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. "1105 (2000) (discussing when government should discount preferences).
73. See Benerjee, supra note 68, at 800.
74. See Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Protests on New Genes and Seeds Grow More Passionatein Europe,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2000, at Al ("In Europe, the debate over genetically modified food is as much
about passion as it is about science.").
75. See Warren Hoge, Britons Skirmish over Genetically Modified Crops, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1999,
at A3.
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switches stems from a concern that publicity about the risks that air bags pose to
children and small adults may lead people to deactivate air bags even when
doing so enhances the net danger to passengers.7 6
The proper regulatory action depends on the source of people's false beliefs
about air bags. If the incorrect belief that air bags are dangerous results from
rational ignorance, the proper response is to post labels explaining that people
should activate the air bags unless a child or small adult is in the front seat. If
the belief is the result of a cognitive bias like the availability heuristic, the label
may be an insufficient response. Perhaps a great deal of advertising would be
necessary in order to shift people's beliefs. Alternatively, if nothing can shake
people's beliefs, then the best response is to make it impossible to deactivate the
air bags.
If people switch off air bags because of anxiety or fear, then labels and
advertisements can do no good. One or more of the following responses might
be appropriate: One, permit installation of the switch, because emotion states
tend to weaken and then disappear as time passes. As people become accustomed to the presence of air bags, they will be less likely to deactivate them
inappropriately. Two, prohibit installation of the switch, because emotions are,
even more than cognitive biases, impervious to reasoning. When panicked
people trample each other to escape a sinking ship, no amount of reasoning will
save them. Three, permit installation, and fight emotion with emotion. When
people are afraid, make them feel ashamed; when they are angry, make them
feel pity. Lawyers, politicians, advertisers, and many other professionals are
skilled in the tricky art of manipulating people's emotions. Commercials have
already been used to encourage the use of seat belts by cleverly framing seat
belt use as an obligation that people owe to their loved ones rather than as a
means of protecting themselves. Similarly, commercials could be used to show
that air bag use is necessary to protect loved ones.7 7
VI.

BARGAINING, CONTRACT LAW, AND PROPERTY AND LIABILITY RULES:

A CRITIQUE

OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE

Much economic analysis of property rights argues that when transaction costs
are low, it is more important for courts to ensure that property rights are clear
and easily tradable, rather than to ensure that they are assigned to the more
efficient user, because the ability to trade ensures that the property right will end
up where it is most valued.78
76. See Air Bag On-Off Switches, 62 Fed. Reg. 62,406, 62,414 (Nov. 21, 1997) (noting that
widespread fear of air bags would lead to deactivation of them if that were possible, even when they
enhance safety).
77. Without expressing any opinion as to whether such commercials are effective, I will just note
that Madison Avenue, as well as the government, usually produces vivid, emotionally stimulating
commercials, more so than dry recitations of facts.
78. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1096 (1972). For more recent work on the topic, see

HeinOnline -- 89 Geo. L.J. 2006 2000-2001

2001]

LAW AND THE EMOTIONS

2007

Ward Farnsworth informally tested this view by interviewing lawyers who
represented individuals involved in nuisance suits. 79 Lawyers reported that
plaintiffs who obtained judgments in nuisance cases never sold their rights to
the defendants. The most plausible reason emerges from the descriptions of the
cases. "[The parties] hate each other." 80 A client's reaction to an offer "would
have been to say 'not only "No" but "Hell, no." ' " ' There was "too much bad
blood."8 2 They "disliked each other intensely."83 One imagines that in every
case the plaintiff was angered by the nuisance, which was considered unneighborly. The defendant was angered by the plaintiff's complaints and lawsuit.
Irritation became enmity as the usual indignities of litigation ensued. By the
end, anger and hatred were so intense that (in Farnsworth's view) not even a
mutually beneficial trade would have been possible.
These case studies conform to the common sense intuition that anger interferes with bargaining.84 An angry person's action tendency is to harm the
offender, even at cost to oneself. When two sides of a dispute are angry with
each other, they may both prefer inflicting costs on each other in the form of
continuing litigation rather than by settling. If each party gains more by injuring
the other than by being injured himself, this game is not a prisoners' dilemma;
harming the other person is both the dominant strategy for both parties and the
welfare-maximizing equilibrium. At the same time, a person's ex ante calmstate preference is to avoid fighting and to trade when there are (nonspiterelated) gains from doing so. The calm-state and emotion-state preferences are
in conflict, and, if the former are to be privileged then the emotion-state
preferences must be discounted.
These considerations suggest that the assignment and protection of property
rights should be sensitive to the emotional valence of disputes. Consider the
well-known defense of specific performance. If the value of performance
exceeds the cost, the promisor ought to perform, and specific performance
(unlike expectation damages) does not require an error-prone judicial determination of the promisee's valuation. If the value of performance is less than the
cost, the promisor can pay the promisee to release him from the contract. The
advantage of the damages remedy is that it enables the promisor to breach
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109
HARV. L. REv. 713 (1996).
79. See Ward Farnsworth, Do Parties to Nuisance Cases BargainAfter Judgment? A Glimpse Inside
the Cathedral,in BEHAvIoRAL LAW AND EcONOMics 302 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000). As Farnsworth
notes, the sample is too small for the results to be statistically significant. Id. at 310. There are other
puzzles as well, which suggest problems with the methodology; it is, after all, common knowledge that
parties to lawsuits settle more often than they litigate, and it would be surprising that whatever factors
interfere with bargaining would increase sharply at the time of judgment.
80. Id. at 305.
81. Id. at 306.
82. Id. at 307.
83. Id. at 308.
84. This is also a common assumption in the literature on mediation. See ROGER FISHER ET AL.,
GETTING TO YES 29-32 (1991).
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efficiently without negotiating; but given low transaction costs this advantage
has little value, and transaction costs are likely to be low when there are only
two parties. 85 Thus, specific performance is superior to damages.
The problem with this argument is that the promisor's breach may provoke
the promisee's anger, and the promisee-feeling insulted-will refuse to release
the promisee from the contract. This is very much in the spirit of Farnsworth's
interviews. This potential refusal might not matter if the promisor tries to buy
out the promisee rather than breaching first, but there are two further points of
concern. First, broaching the subject of nonperformance might elicit an angry
reaction, which would then interfere with negotiations. Second, negotiations
would, in any event, occur in the shadow of the promisee's angry reaction to
breach.
Imagine, then, that an exogenous event causes a seller's cost to exceed the
buyer's valuation. Under specific performance, if the seller breaches, she must
either perform or pay the buyer's entire valuation. But if the buyer is angry, the
buyer will incur a cost to spite the seller, and this means that the buyer may
insist on performance even though he values it less than a proposed payment
equal to the entire surplus. Anticipating this, the seller performs rather than
breaches. By contrast, under expectation damages the seller would breach and
pay damages equal to the buyer's valuation, with the inefficient trade avoided.
Expectation damages are superior to specific performance because
the plaintiff
86
cannot prevent an efficient trade in order to spite the promisor.
A premise of this argument is that the law should respect the buyer's
calm-state preferences and not his emotion-state preferences. If, instead, the law
should respect the buyer's emotion-state preferences, specific performance
would be the correct remedy, given the difficulty of determining the amount of
money that would make an angry buyer indifferent between performance and
breach. Ex ante the buyer most likely would prefer that his emotion-state
preferences be discounted. If that view is entitled to respect, then courts should
award expectation damages; otherwise, the seller will pass the expected cost of
specific performance on to the buyer and the buyer will be forced, against his
calm-state preferences, to purchase the right when angry to spite the seller!
Some buyers might want this right, but this would seem unusual. As long as
calm-state preferences are to be counted, and buyers want their calm-state
preferences to be counted, expectation damages are superior to specific performance when breach would lead to anger.
Notice that emotion introduces an asymmetry into the standard analysis of
contract remedies. The person who breaches will not feel any anger, while the
85. See generally Alan Schwartz, The Casefor Specific Performance,89 YALE L.J. 27 (1979).
86. One response to the argument so far is that under specific performance the seller will bargain
with the buyer prior to breach. If the buyer is not angered by a proposal to bargain, then the potential
anger does not distort pre-breach bargaining. The seller will give the buyer the entire surplus in order to
avoid angering him, but the buyer, while calm, would not demand more, because he would not, given
his calm preferences, do better by inducing his own anger and then refusing to trade.
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victim of the breach is likely to become angry. The reason is that the contract
sets up a background norm of performance, and the person who breaks that
norm injures the person who complies with it. If it is not desirable for a trade to
occur, which will often be the case, expectation damages have the virtue of
giving the property right to the calm person, whereas specific performance has
the defect of giving the property right to the angry person. Taking ex ante
calm-state preferences as the normative baseline, specific performance reduces
the value of contracts.
Further factors might bear on the choice between remedies in specific situations. Anger subsides rapidly when the agent realizes that the offensive act was
unintentional or in some way justified. If you push me, I might get angry, but
my anger dissolves when you explain that you tripped and grabbed me to
prevent yourself from falling, or that you were running away from a mugger.
Similarly, anger-and, thus, specific performance-may pose fewer problems
when a breach is excusable rather than willful. It is notoriously difficult to
distinguish excusable from willful breaches in contract cases, but one possible
approach is to distinguish breaches when the trade is ex post inefficient (the
seller's cost exceeds the buyer's valuation) from breaches when the trade is ex
post efficient. The latter can only be an attempt to hold up the promisee for a
higher payment, and so seem willful; the former are at least jointly valuemaximizing, making them somewhat less objectionable. 8 7 If this is so, specific
performance is the appropriate remedy for less willful breaches, and expectation
damages for more willful breaches.
One can see this point from another angle. If, as Robert Frank argues,
emotions evolve to enable people to make credible their threat to retaliate if
another person breaks a promise,8 8 then this adaptation constrains the ability of
the law to ensure that welfare-maximizing exchanges are made. Frank argues
that people restrain themselves from breaking promises and engaging in other
opportunistic behavior, in part, because they fear retaliation. Retaliation is not
always individually rational, but may be compelled by emotion. Thus, emotion
solves a problem of cooperation. But if emotion causes people to retaliate
without carefully weighing the costs and benefits, people will retaliate even
when breach is efficient and both sides would do better if the promisor
compensated the promisee but did not perform. Giving the enraged promisee
the tool of specific performance enables her to exact retaliation when, given the
availability of a more modest legal remedy like expectation damages, both sides
would do better (as measured by calm-state preferences) if retaliation did not
occur.

The normative implication of this discussion contradicts current law. Specific
performance and harsh remedies like punitive damages should not be available
when the promisor's breach is egregious and thus likely to lead to an emotional

87. See, e.g., Groves v. John Wunder Co., 286 N.W. 235, 236 (Minn. 1939).
88. See FRANK, supra note 2, at 43-46.
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response from the promisee. Expectation damages are more appropriate. The
same is true for nuisance suits. Money damages are the superior remedy when
the nuisance creates anger and hard feelings, assuming away the cost of
determining damages. Injunctions are more suitable when emotion is unlikely to
interfere with bargaining.8 9
VII.

NORMATIVE ISSUES

Normative economic analysis evaluates laws on the basis of their contribution to social welfare. Social welfare is usually defined as a function that
aggregates individual utility functions, which themselves are representations of
the preference orderings of every citizen. If a person prefers outcome X to
outcome Y, then a law that changes Y to X increases that person's utility, and if
the law has no other effect, it also increases social welfare. 90
Emotion has a complex relationship to a person's well-being, 9 ' but we can
focus on two aspects. The experience of an emotion state can be an intrinsic
good or bad, or an instrumental good or bad. A person might seek joy or
euphoria for its own sake and avoid fear or anxiety because they are unpleasant
sensations. An acrophobe, for example, avoids high places that are perfectly
safe because the sensation of fear is disagreeable. A person might also seek an
emotion state as a means toward an end. For example, he might mentally
conjure up past insults in order to generate a feeling of outrage prior to
confronting a bully. Or a person might use mental exercises in order to suppress
fear that interferes with public speaking. In short, an emotion can be experienced as an end in itself or as a means toward other things.
In both cases, people have preferences over their emotion states, and thus
these preferences can be absorbed into normative economic analysis. If the
government seeks to enhance social welfare, and people have intrinsic or
instrumental preferences over emotion states, then the law should be used to
help people satisfy their preferences at least cost. It is this view that has guided
the earlier discussions of criminal law and other areas of the law. If people
manipulate their emotions in order to overcome scruples and commit crimes,
then the law should punish this behavior. If emotions interfere with bargaining
that can enhance welfare, then the law should reallocate property rights so that
parties can depend less on bargaining.
89. Peter Huang analyzes emotions and bargaining in Peter H. Huang, Reasons Within Passion:
Emotions and Intentions in Property Rights Bargaining, 79 OR. L. REV 435, 465-71. (2000). Our
articles were written independently, but come to some similar conclusions about the relevance of
emotions to bargaining about property rights. Also note Huang's earlier paper on the effect of emotional
reactions on litigation incentives. Peter H. Huang & Ho-Mou Wu, Emotional Responses in Litigation,
12 INT'L REV. LAW & ECON. 31 (1992).
90. This is a simplification of a complex topic, toward which economists have taken diverse
approaches. See Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J.
165, 177 (1999).
91. See Nico H. Frijda, Emotions and Hedonic Experience, in WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF
HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY 190, 205 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1999).
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The difficulty with this simple view is that many preferences are registered
under the influence of the emotion or are inextricably tied up with an emotion
state. The problem for the government is evaluating these kinds of preferences-as opposed to calm-state preferences about the desirability of being in
an emotion state. This problem arises when government agencies engage in
cost-benefit analysis and must decide whether valuations, reflected in surveys or
derived from market behavior, ought to be taken seriously. A person who is
angered by a government request for a valuation of a mountain view might
retaliate by providing an implausible valuation. Similarly, a person who panics
over a report about a nearby toxic waste dump might sell his house at a price
that does not reflect his real need for shelter.
It is typical of an angry or fearful person to ignore relevant information when
making choices. Nussbaum argues that disgust is a form of magical thinking,
and many judgments based on disgust (like not wanting to drink from a
92
sterilized cup that earlier contained urine) do not reflect a person's well-being.
If this argument is correct, then choices made while angry, fearful, or disgusted
might not reflect the person's "real" well-being, which is just a way of saying
that the economic assumption that unadjusted subjective preferences have
fundamental normative value must be rejected. Preferences should not be used
as the basis for regulation if they are "distorted" in some way. It is commonly
argued that preferences are distorted if they are uninformed, or adaptive in some
sense (sour grapes), or morally objectionable. Many welfarists, for example, do
not include sadistic preferences in the social welfare function because they are
morally wrong.9 3 One might argue that certain preferences that manifest themselves in emotion states should not be counted for similar reasons. An angry,
disgusted, or fearful person focuses on one aspect of the world to the exclusion
of others. He has a distorted perspective on the relationship between the world
and his own (calm-state) well-being. His temporary preferences can be likened,
therefore, to uninformed preferences, which are commonly ignored in realworld regulation as well.
Yet there is another view: Choices made under the influence of emotion
reflect a person's well-being more accurately than choices made in the calm
state.
The psychology literature insists that certain emotions spring into existence
because the environment poses a threat to the agent's well-being and that
emotional reactions register threats that escape cognition. For example, one
might feel anxiety or anger without knowing why because noncognitive areas of
the brain have detected a threat and are preparing the individual to react. That
person's emotion-state behavior might be more consistent with his well-being
92. Nussbaum, supra note 48, at 22-25.
93. See AMARTYA SEN, CHOICE, WELFARE AND MEASUREMENT 84-106 (1982); John C. Harsanyi, Game
and Decision Theoretic Models in Ethics, in 1 HANDBOOK OF GAME THEORY WITH ECONOMIC APPLICATIONS

669, 703-04 (Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart eds., 1992). See generally Adler & Posner, supra
note 90.
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than the behavior in which he would engage if he were calm. Disgust often
reveals that a substance poses dangers of which the disgusted person has no
conscious knowledge. In general, a person in an emotion state may be more,
rather than less, perceptive about moral realities and physical threats.94 Thus,
people often describe themselves as roused to action on the basis of photographs or stories that stimulate their indignation or horror.
Similar comments apply to emotional dispositions-and here the problem
remains even if people were always in calm states when filling out contingentvaluation questionnaires or engaging in market behavior. A person with an
emotional disposition to feel disgust will take this into account when (calmly)
engaging in market behavior or when answering surveys that elicit valuations
for the purpose of cost-benefit analysis. Suppose he feels disgusted whenever he
sees adults of the same sex holding hands. This person might be willing to pay
for laws that discourage such behavior because he wishes to avoid the sensation
of disgust. The question is whether this person's preference should count, just as
it would surely count if he were objecting to a noxious odor caused by
pollution. To answer this question, one must resolve a methodological issue,
namely, whether we should look through the lens of emotion or of morality. The
lens of emotion suggests that whether the preferences should count in this case
depends on whether they are based on magical thinking rather than a correct
assessment of the impact of the behavior on the person's well-being.9 5 An
alternative view is that whether the valuation should be taken into account
depends on whether the agent can supply a moral justification for it.
The point I want to make is that both emotion-state preferences and calmstate preferences that reflect emotional disposition cannot automatically be
either ignored as defective because "emotional," or counted as "just preferences." Both kinds of preferences must be evaluated, and included in or
excluded from the social welfare function, in accordance with the degree to
which satisfaction of them contributes to the individual's well-being.

94. See RONALD DE SOUSA, THE RATIONALITY OF EMOTION (1987); MILLER, supra note 48, at 179-205;
Greenspan, supra note 11, at 471-75. Many of the essays in THE PASSIONS OF LAW, supra note 1, discuss
this as well.
95. Compare this with Nussbaum's discussion of magical thinking. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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